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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
CERTAINTY IN DEFINITION OF CRIMES-DISTURBING THE PEACE
Vagrancy and disturbing the peace laws and ordinances have
long been used to get undesirable and suspicious persons off the
streets and under arrest. The United States Supreme Court, in a
series of fairly recent decisions, has served notice that such legislative
enactments must be clearly stated and not overly broad in their scope
if they are to meet due process standards.' Following this mandate,
a federal district court held the last part of clause (7) of Louisiana's
vagrancy article, which punished loitering "around any public place
of assembly, without lawful business or reason to be present," to be
unconstitutionally vague and overly broad.2
The most recent public order offenses to flunk the constitution-
ality test have been clauses (2) and (7) of Louisiana's disturbing the
peace statute.3 Following a recent sweeping holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Gooding v. Wilson,4 the Louisiana supreme
court posited its holdings that clauses (2) and (7) were unconstitu-
tional upon the ground that those broadly stated provisions consti-
tuted an impairment of the first amendment privilege of freedom of
speech. In two briefly stated opinions,5 the court stressed the import-
ance of avoiding possible impairment of constitutionally protected
freedom of expression. In connection with clause (2), for example, the
court stated that the punishment of "unnecessarily loud, offensive or
insulting language in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb and
alarm -the public" might be "susceptible of application to speech,
although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and Four-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Coates v. City of Cin., 402 U.S. 611 (1970); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1971) (where a Jacksonville, Florida ordinance was found by a unanimous
court to flunk every constitutional test, giving unbridled sanction to police for arrest
of non-conformists). See also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (holding
invalid a "suspicious person" ordinance used to pick up late night street loiterers).
2. Scott v. District Att'y, 309 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. La. 1970).
3. LA. R.S. 14:103 (1950).
4. 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
5. State v. Adams, 263 La. 286, 268 So. 2d 228 (1972) (holding clause (7) unconsti-
tutional); State v. Ganch, 263 La. 251, 268 So. 2d 214 (1972) (holding clause (2)
unconstitutional). Other even more broadly stated supplemental disturbing the peace
statutes were similarly held unconstitutional in State v. Brown, 282 So. 2d 707 (La.
1973) (holding R.S. 14:103(B)(2)(e) unconstitutional); and State v. Harrison, 280 So.
2d 215 (La. 1973) (holding R.S. 14:103.1(A)(1) unconstitutional).
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teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."'
Just when a statute is overly broad and provides an impermissi-
ble invasion of the constitutional right of free speech, is only indi-
cated in a negative way by the decisions. Fortunately, City of New
Orleans v. Lewis7 provides solace and further guidance to those who
may be drafting vagrancy and disturbing the peace statutes or ordi-
nances. In upholding a New Orleans police cursing ordinance the
Louisiana supreme court stressed the limiting nature of the language
of the ordinance, which made it an offense "for any person wantonly
to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward
or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual
performance of his duty."8 Justice Hamlin's majority opinion con-
cluded that the ordinance only covered "fighting words" which were
likely to produce public violence; and further stressed the paramount
importance of protecting police while in the performance of their
duties to protect the community. Thus, it was concluded that the
ordinance was "narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate
interest. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would riase no
question under that instrument."9 Dissenting Justice Tate'" did not
disagree with the general principles announced by Justice Hamlin,
but concluded that those criteria were not met by the New Orleans
ordinance. Justice Tate found it difficult to agree that the ordinance
was limited to "fighting words." Even more importantly, the ordi-
nance was violated by opprobrious language "with reference to" an
officer engaged in the performance of his duty. The ordinance did not
require that the language be used in the officer's presence. Thus, the
potential breach of peace and actual interference with law enforce-
ment were not essential elements of a violation. It would appear that
the ordinance draftsman's objectives (stressed by Justice Hamlin)
were sound, but its implementation (as shown by Justice Tate's dis-
sent) may have been somewhat defective. Statutes and ordinances in
the vagrancy, disorderly conduct and breach of the peace area are of
major social significance, and their purpose should not be defeated
6. State v. Adams, 263 La. 286, 287, 268 So. 2d 228, 229 (1972).
7. 263 La. 809, 269 So. 2d 450 (1972).
8. Id. at 814, 269 So. 2d at 452.
9. Id. at 823, 269 So. 2d at 455.
10. Id. at 828-37, 269 So. 2d at 457-60. (Justices Barham and Dixon concurred in
the dissent.)
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by hyper-technical construction.'1 Yet such statutes must be carefully
drawn with such specificity that they will not serve as a dragnet for
the arrest of unsavory characters who have not committed or are not
planning any substantial identifiable wrong. Such drafting requires
skill of the proverbial "Philadelphia lawyer." The Lewis opinions,
whether one agrees with the majority opinion or the dissent, provide
substantial guidance for prospective draftsmen and should be care-
fully studied.
FURMAN v. GEORGIA-LouSIANA APPLICATIONS AND IMPACTS
Furman v. Georgia'" was the key decision in a triology of cases
wherein the United States Supreme Court set aside death sentences
in two Georgia capital cases (one for rape and the other for murder)
and in a Texas rape conviction, as constituting cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
In these cases the death sentences were pursuant to a procedure,
similar to the then controlling Louisiana procedure,"3 whereby the
jury was given the discretionary authority to retdrn a qualified ver-
dict of guilty without capital punishment. In each of the cases the
jury had not seen fit to qualify its verdict. The cases were remanded
for re-sentencing to life imprisonment. Because of the importance of
the holding, and also because of the variety of considerations which
motivated their conclusions, separate opinions were filed by the var-
ious Supreme Court Justices. The decision was 5 to 4 and only two
of the majority Justices, Brennan and Marshall, were ready to hold
that capital punishment was per se "cruel and unusual" by reason
of its severe and degrading nature. Concurring Justices Stewart,
White and Douglas stressed the nature of the Georgia procedure
which had resulted in the random selection of a few defendants for
the death penalty. Justice Stewart concluded "that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence
of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be
so wantonly and freakishly imposed.""4 Justice White recognized the
probable validity of statutes requiring imposition of the death penal-
ties for narrowly defined categories of murder or rape, but condemned
11. In an important and well-reasoned case, upholding the public bribery article
of the criminal code, Chief Justice Fournet logically pointed out that the court should
not strike down a statute because there may be marginal cases where doubt might
arise. State v. Smith, 252 La. 636, 212 So. 2d 410 (1968).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 817.
14. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972).
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the Georgia procedure that provided for infrequent application of the
death penalty with no guiding critiera.5 Justice Douglas posited his
concurring opinion upon the discriminatory way the penalty was im-
posed on poor and minority classes "whose numers are few, who are
outcasts of society, and who are unpopular." 6 Dissenting Chief Jus-
tice Burger was most helpful in suggesting that even-handed justice
must be provided if capital punishment is to be upheld. It was im-
plicit in Justice Burger's opinion that capital punishment should be
upheld if it was uniformly applied to all and reserved for "a small
category of the most heinous crimes."17 Justice Burger's clearly stated
dissent, fortified by a careful study of the Stewart, White and Doug-
las opinions, has guided the thinking of subsequent state legislation
aimed at preserving capital punishment in a form that would, hope-
fully, meet with Supreme Court approval.
Post-Furman Louisiana decisions have provided a logical imple-
mentation of the Furman mandate. State v. Franklin8 and a series
of similarly decided cases,'" upon setting aside imposition of the
death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment, affirmed the convic-
tion, and remanded the case with instructions to the trial judge to
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. This was in conformity
with the disposition of the case in Furman, and was also in accord
with the disposition of analogous cases where capital penalties had
been set aside under Witherspoon v. Illinois.20 In those instances
where death penalties had been invalidated because of exclusion of
prospective jurors who had only general conscientious scruples
against capital punishment, the convictions were affirmed but the
cases were remanded for sentences of life imprisonment to be im-
posed. It should be noted that there had been no reversible defects
in the trial procedures in Franklin, and the only constitutional in-
firmity was in the nature of the verdict and sentence. This defect
could be remedied by the imposition of a constitutionally permissible
sentence.
The impact of Furman upon special state procedures to be fol-
lowed in so-called "capital" cases was presented in two 1972 cases.
15. Id. at 238.
16. Id. at 245.
17. Id. at 375.
18. 263 La. 344, 268 So. 2d 249 (1972).
19. State v. Square, 263 La. 291, 268 So. 2d 229 (1972); State v. Williams, 263 La.
284, 268 So. 2d 227 (1972); State v. Poland, 263 La. 269, 268 So. 2d 221 (1972); State
v. Singleton, 263 La. 267, 268 So. 2d 220 (1972).
20. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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In State v. Holmes" the Louisiana supreme court held that, although
capital punishment could no longer be imposed under Louisiana's
qualified verdict procedures, murder was still classified by the legis-
lature as a "capital" crime. As a result, the special capital crime
procedural requirements of a unanimous verdict" and for sequestra-
tion of the jury during the trial,2 were still applicable to a murder
trial. The importance of this holding, on a question where authority
from other states was clearly divided, is illustrated by the list, in
Justice Dixon's thorough and helpful appendix, of the numerous spe-
cial procedural rules which must be followed in capital cases. 4 In
essence, murder, aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping are still
capital crimes in Louisiana, even though death sentences can not be
imposed under Louisiana's special verdict procedures which provide
for the same unguided jury determinations which were held unconsti-
tutional in Furman. "Nor indeed," aptly stated Justice Dixon, "has
the United States Supreme Court eliminated the possibility that the
Louisiana legislature might enact statutes which could constitution-
ally impose the death sentence, when the sentence, is mandatory and
cannot be applied in a discriminatory manner. '25 Justices Barham
and Tate filed vigorous dissents predicated on the idea that "capital"
offenses should be limited to crimes for which a death sentence could
actually be imposed. Justice Barham stated, "It was the severe and
irreparable consequences which accompanied a verdict of guilty that
impelled the Legislature and courts to afford additional safeguards
for the defendant." 26
In State v. Flood27 the other side of the Holmes coin was pre-
sented, and the issue was whether the constitutional and statutory
restrictions on bail in capital cases were still applicable to a defen-
dant accused of murder.28 In holding that a murder defendant was not
entitled to bail where the proof was evident or the presumption great,
the supreme court again stressed the classification theory, and held
that the intended procedural structures for the trial of crimes desig-
nated by the legislature as capital had not been changed by Furman.
Again, as in Holmes, Justice Barham dissented concluding that, "the
21. 263 La. 685, 269 So. 2d 207 (1972).
22. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 782.
23. Id. art. 791.
24. 263 La. 685, 694, 269 So. 2d 207, 210 (1972).
25. Id. at 691, 269 So. 2d at 209.
26. Id. at 696, 269 So. 2d at 211.
27. 263 La. 700, 269 So. 2d 212 (1972).
28. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 313.
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end of the death penalty tolls the end of the denial of bail.""9
Discussion of the impacts of Furman would not be complete
without a brief statement of Louisiana's 1973 legislative efforts to
provide constitutionally effective capital punishment. An experi-
enced and capable committee was appointed by Governor Edwards
to prepare and propose appropriate legislation.3 In view of the var-
iously stated opinions of the Justices in Furman it was difficult to
determine whether, or in what form, capital punishment would be
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. The committee's
package of capital punishment bills, following suggestions of dissent-
ing Chief Justice Burger in Furman and Louisiana's Justice Dixon in
Holmes, were predicated upon two cardinal principles. First, where
capital punishment is provided it must be mandatory, and not im-
posed by the unguided whim or caprice of individual juries. Thus, the
qualified verdict provision of article 817 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was eliminated. Secondly, capital punishment should be
limited to super-atrocious crimes and crimes where effective adminis-
tration of justice demands this extreme penalty. This was accom-
plished by providing first degree murder which was limited to killings
where there was a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm,
and where one of five separately stated aggravated situations was
present. In brief, these included intentional killings in the perpetra-
tion or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated kid-
napping or armed robbery; intentional killing of a police officer or
fireman who was engaged in the performance of his duties; or inten-
tional killings where the offender had been previously convicted of an
unrelated murder or was serving a life sentence, where multiple
killings were intended, or where the killing was for hire." Other crimi-
nal homicides, which had previously been murder under the 1942
Criminal Code, were shifted to the lessor crime of second degree
murder and carried the penalty of life imprisonment without eligibil-
ity for parole or probation until at least twenty years had been
served."
It was contemplated that first degree murder would be the only
capital crime, so the committee's legislative package included bills
reducing the penalty for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape and
29. 263 La. 685, 711, 269 So. 2d 207, 216 (1972) (citing New Jersey and Texas
cases).
30. The committee was composed of John Mamouledes, John Parkerson, Joe Tri-
tico, Edwin Ware, III, Jack Yelverton and Robert Pugh, chairman.
31. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 110, § 1.
32. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1973).
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treason to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for twenty
years. Unfortunately these supplemental bills were not enacted. The
most tragic loss was the non-enactment of the bill that would have
reduced the penalty for aggravated rape to life imprisonment. As a
purely practical matter, it might have discouraged killing of rape
victims if a greater penalty were provided where the victim was
killed. As the law now stands, the rapist has nothing to lose by killing
the one and only eye-witness to his crime. Also a survey of the aggra-
vated rape laws of other states indicated that capital punishment is
a rare and unusually harsh penalty for that crime.
It is submitted that the very limited first degree murder offense
which was carved out by the 1973 statute should meet the constitu-
tional tests which are indicated by the variously articulated opinions
in Furman. The requirements for first degree murder, as distin-
guished from second degree murder, are clearly drawn. First degree
murder covers situations where there is real justification for the ulti-
mate penalty. Also by the deletion of the qualified verdict provision
in article 817 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,. the imposition of
capital punishment is mandatory in first degree murder convictions.
In addition to the crucial amendment of article 817, a number
of other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended
to adjust their procedure to the newly created first degree murder
offense. Article 465 was amended to provide specific indictment
forms for first and second degree murder. Article 557 was amended
to remove the qualified plea of guilty without capital punishment,
which it was thought might be subject to the same constitutional
infirmity as the qualified verdict. Article 598, relative to the effects
of lesser pleas, was amended. In article 814, responsive verdicts for
first and second degree murder were added. These responsive verdicts
conform with the original special responsive verdicts for murder. In
first degree murder, responsive verdicts of second degree murder and
manslaughter give the jury an opportunity to return those lesser ver-
dicts when the elements of first degree murder are not fully proven.
The definitions of those homicidal crimes provide definite guidelines
for the jury in making such determinations. The jury does not have
unguided discretion, such as that which was held unconstitutional in
Furman.
OTHER "CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" DECISIONS
While the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel or unusual
punishment is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amend-
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ment,3 3 the Louisiana supreme court has been consistently reluctant
to restrict legislative penalty determinations in non-capital cases.3 In
State v. Neal35 and in State v. Howard,3 the supreme court again
upheld armed robbery sentences despite the Draconic nature of the
penalty which the Louisiana legislature had fixed at 5 to 99 years
"without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. 17
The wisdom of such a penalty, where a youthful first offender who
played a very minor part in the planning and execution of the robbery
must always serve at least five years in the state penitentiary, is very
doubtful,3 8 and is out of line with the more flexible handling of armed
robbery penalties in most other states. However, the supreme court
reiterated its established policy that "the type of punishment (and
not the severity as to time imposed) determines what is prohibited
as cruel and unusual punishment."3 Clutching at a judicial straw,
defense counsel in State v. Miller"9 urged that the worthless check
statute, which gives felony status to the issuing of a bad check of
$100.00 or more, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In rather
summarily rejecting that contention, the supreme court stated that
under the federal and Louisiana constitutions, "[c]ruel and unusual
punishments are those that are barbarous, extraordinary, or grossly
disproportionate to the offense. In short, the constitutional prohibi-
tion is directed to punishments that shock the conscience of civilized
men."' 1 It may be suggested that, while considerable legislative lee-
way is recognized, if the worthless check statute had imposed the
armed robbery penalty of 5 to 99 years without possibility of proba-
tion or parole for issuing checks of less than $100, the claim of "cruel
and unusual punishment" would probably have succeeded.
In considering claims of "cruel and unusual punishment" article
878 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure is significant. That
article, which is well supported by Louisiana and federal jurisprud-
33. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); LA. CONST. art. I, § 12 similarly
provides.
34. State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1953) (upholding drastic narcotic
penalties and stressing the moral degeneration resulting from such crimes).
35. 275 So. 2d 765 (La. 1973).
36. 262 La. 270, 263 So. 2d 32, 35 (1972).
37. LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 380, § 1; 1962, No.
475, § 1; 1966, Ex. Sess., No. 5, § 1.
38. A Louisiana Law Institute bill which would have authorized probation or
parole for first offenders was rejected by the 1972 Louisiana Legislature.
39. State v. Neal, 275 So. 2d 765, 768 (La. 1973).
40. 263 La. 960, 269 So. 2d 829 (1972).
41. Id. at 962, 269 So. 2d at 830.
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ence,4" states that "[a] sentence shall not be set aside on the ground
that it inflicts cruel or unusual punishment unless the statute under
which it is imposed is found unconstitutional.""3 Thus, it is the gen-
eral statutory penalty, rather than the particular sentence imposed,
which is subject to constitutional review.
SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT OF MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER
Both first degree murder" and intentional second degree mur-
der 5 require "a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."46
Such an intent will be implied from the use of a deadly weapon-as
by stabbing or shooting the victim.47 A more difficult burden of proof
is imposed for a conviction of attempted murder which requires a
specific intent to kill. In State v. Lee 48 a conviction of attempted
murder was supported by evidence showing that the defendant had
"fired at least one shot at the alleged victim."49 It is conceivable,
however, that a deadly weapon may be used with a specific intent to
maim or seriously injure, rather than to kill. In such a situation the
defendant would be guilty of murder if the victim died, but would not
be guilty of attempted murder if the shot or blow did not kill the
victim. By the nature of the attempt definition 0 a specific intent to
commit the crime, which may be more demanding than the intent
required for the completed offense, is an essential element of that
offense. Similarly, an attempt to commit aggravated arson requires
a specific intent, while the basic crime of aggravated arson only re-
quires a general intent.5
FELONY-MURDER PROVISION
Louisiana's felony-murder offense, which is now included in the
42. State v. Vittoria, 224 La. 258, 261, 69 So. 2d 36, 37 (1953); State v. Gros, 208
La. 135, 139, 23 So. 2d 24, 25, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945).
43. LA. CODE CIM. P. art. 878.
44. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 110, § 1.
45. LA. R.S. 14:30.1(1) (Supp. 1973).
46. Id.
47. This presumption was recently recognized in State v. Jordan, 276 So. 2d 277,
279 (La. 1973).
48. 275 So. 2d 757 (La. 1973).
49. Id. at 760.
50. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 471, § 1.
51. LA. R.S. 14:51 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 117, § 1. Aggravated
arson requires "the intentional damaging.., or setting fire to. "See also LA. R.S.
14:10(2) (1950); 14:11 (1950).
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crime of second degree murder,5" follows the modem trend to limit
felony-murder liability to unintended homicides committed in the
perpetration of "such felonies as are in themselves inherently danger-
ous to human life."53 It applies to enumerated dangerous felonies
where there is a great likelihood that death or great bodily harm will
result.5 4 In State v. Freza 155 defense counsel attacked the felony-
murder rule on the ground "that it allegedly 'imposes an intent where
none actually existed,' and 'punishes the defendant where there is no
criminal intent.' "56 In overruling defendant's contention of unconsti-
tutionality, the Louisiana supreme court pointed out that, although
the felony-murder rule does not require proof of a specific intent to
kill or inflict great bodily harm, it is not without a substantial mens
rea requirement. It requires proof that the killer was committing or
attempting to commit one of the enumerated dangerous felonies, and
the state's burden of proof as to the underlying felony "requires the
state to prove the criminal intent, be it general or specific, requisite
to convict defendant of such felony." 57
It is significant, though academic as to that case, to note the
effects of the 1973 revision of Louisiana's homicide articles on the
factual situation presented in Frezal. In Frezal the felony-murder
doctrine of original article 30(2) of the criminal code was applied to
the killing of the victim of an attempted rape. The new felony-second
degree murder provision generally followed the original dangerous
felony enumeration, but with two changes. Aggravated escape, which
is characterized by the endangering of human life,"8 has been added
to the felony-murder list. Aggravated rape was deleted from the list
of enumerated felonies in the new second degree murder article59 by
a legislative committee which apparently wanted to make doubly
sure that all rapists would be prosecuted for a capital crime. The
attempted rape homicide in Frezal was a situation which that com-
mittee may have overlooked. The only crime which the would-be
rapist, who unintentionally killed his intended victim, could be
52. LA. R.S. 14:30.1(2) (Supp. 1973).
53. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966).
54. LA. R.S. 14:30.1(2) (Supp. 1973): "Second degree murder is the killing of a
human being: . . . (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggra-
vated rape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill."
55. 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973).
56. Id. at 68.
57. Id. at 69.
58. LA. R.S. 14:110B (Supp. 1972).
59. LA. R.S. 14:30.1(2) (Supp. 1973).
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charged with would be manslaughter. Clause (2)(a) of the man-
slaughter article applies to unintentional killings in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of "any felony not enumerated in articles
30 or 30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the
person."' While aggravated rape is enumerated in clause (1) of arti-
cle 30, attempted rape resulting in death will almost always involve
a battery, which is a misdemeanor directly affecting the person. The
maximum penalty for manslaughter, however, is only imprisonment
for twenty-one years." It might be argued that the specific intent to
rape should be equated with a specific intent to inflict great bodily
harm. Then the accidental killing in attempting to perpetrate rape
could be prosecuted for first degree murder under clause (1) of article
30, as amended in 1973. Such a broad construction of the phrase
"intent to inflict great bodily harm" does not appear logical or proba-
ble.
BURGLARY-UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY REQUIREMENT
Common law burglary, and the burglary statutes of many states,
require a "breaking and entry" of the building burglarized. The
"breaking" requirement was easily satisfied by the displacement of
any obstruction to free entry, such as the pushing open of an unlocked
screen door.62 It was "not necessary that splinters fly to have a break-
ing."63 As one court succinctly stated, any "act of force, however
slight, by which an obstruction to entrance is removed . . . is suffi-
cient . . . where the entry is unlawful." 4 The burglary articles in the
criminal code deleted the technical "breaking" requirement, and this
element of the burglary crimes was satisfied by an "unauthorized
entry." In State v. Dunn 5 the defendants had entered a washateria
and a high school building for the purpose of stealing money from
vending machines therein. The Louisiana supreme court held that
the trial court had committed reversible error when it refused to
instruct the jury to the effect that entering a building open to the
public could not be an "unauthorized entry" for purposes of the sim-
ple burglary offense.6 In so holding the court stated, "[i]n the case
of a building which is open to the public, the consent to enter the
60. LA. R.S. 14:31 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 111, § 2.
61. Id.
62. State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939).
63. United States v. Evans, 415 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1969).
64. Byington v. State, 363 P.2d 301, 303 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1961).
65. 263 La. 58, 267 So. 2d 193 (1972).
66. LA. R.S. 14:62 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 649, § 1.
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building at the times which it is open to the public, and within the
confines designated is implied. Therefore, there is no unauthorized
entry because consent is present.""7 The court rejected the state's
ingenuous contention that the authority to enter the buildings was
limited to entry for lawful purposes, and that entry to steal was
always unauthorized. If the authority to enter was to be vitiated by
the defendant's intent to steal, the "unauthorized entry" require-
ment would be meaningless, and all shoplifters would, surprisingly,
be guilty of simple burglary. In a very sound and practical interpreta-
tion of the Louisiana criminal code requirements, the court stated,
"[als we construe the burglary statute, the entry must be unauthor-
ized and this must be determined as a distinct element of the offense
separate and apart from the intent to steal. If the legislature desired
that burglary consist of only an entry with intent to steal, they would
have omitted the word unauthorized. ' ' 8
ATTEMPTED THEFT BY FRAUDULENT USE OF STUDENT I.D. CARD
In State v. McIntyre" the defendant had sought to gain admis-
sion to an L.S.U. football game by presenting a borrowed I.D. card
and representing that he was the student to whom the card had been
issued. Student I.D. cards are issued for the sole use of the student
owner and are expressly non-transferable. Defendant was denied
admission to the game and was prosecuted for attempted theft of
entertainment services valued at seven dollars, i.e., the right to view
an L.S.U. football game. In support of the attempted theft charge, it
should be noted that the privilege of viewing a football game is a
thing of value and a proper subject of theft. The term "anything of
value" is broadly defined, to "be given the broadest possible con-
struction, including any conceivable thing of the slightest value-and
including-any other service available for hire."7 Seeking to obtain
admission to a game by "fraudulent conduct, practices or representa-
tions" would constitute attempted theft.7 Why, then, did the Louis-
67. 263 La. at 63, 267 So. 2d at 195 (1972).
68. Id. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Macias v. People, 161 Colo. 233, 421 P.2d 116
(1966); State v. Starkweather, 89 Mont. 381, 297 P. 497 (1931).
69. 263 La. 803, 269 So. 2d 448 (1972).
70. See LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1; 1970
No. 458, § 1; 1972 No. 653, § 1 (theft); 14:2(2) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962,
No. 68, § 1 (definition of "anything of value").
71. See LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1; 1970
No. 458, § 1; 1972, No. 653, § 1 (theft); 14:27 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970,
No. 471, § 1.
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iana supreme court hold that it was not attempted theft when the
defendant sought to gain admission to a football game by falsely
representing himself as a student with an I.D. card? The basis of the
court's holding is indicated by two statements in the opinion. First,
the court concluded that the matter was one which "addresses itself
to the internal discipline of Louisiana State University. . . .Any
discipline administered the student lender had to be imposed by the
University."72 This argument is weakened by the fact that defendant
McIntyre was a non-student who had sought to obtain something of
value from the University by representing himself as a student holder
of the I.D. card. Further insight into the court's holding is evidenced
by the court's conclusion that the University had lost nothing by the
thwarted attempted fraud. "The loser," said the court, "was the
student, he missed seeing the game. The University under the cir-
cumstances herein presented lost nothing. 7 3 This method of reason-
ing loses sight of the true nature of attempts under article 27 of the
criminal code. The attempt is punishable even though the defendant
failed to accomplish his criminal purpose and no harm was actually
suffered by the intended victim. The McIntyre decision appears to
follow the premise that the essential basis of purported liability was
a student's violation of the non-transferable nature of the I.D. card
holder's privilege. It was felt that this matter could best be handled
by internal University sanctions, rather than by criminal prosecu-
tions. In essence the court was not ready to treat defendant's conduct
as "fraudulent", within the meaning of the Louisiana theft article. A
very close case, which might well have been decided the other way,
was presented.
ARMED ROBBERY-SLIGHT PERIOD OF POSSESSION
Robbery is theft which has been accomplished "by use of force
or intimidation," and armed robbery includes the aggravating ele-
ment that the criminal was "armed with a dangerous weapon."7' In
State v. Neal 5 the armed defendant had seized the victim's wallet,
but had immediately dropped it when fired upon by the victim. The
handing over of the wallet and defensive firing by the victim had been
substantially simultaneous. One of the issues on appeal was whether
72. 263 La. at 807, 269 So. 2d at 449.
73. Id., 269 So. 2d at 450.
74. LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 380, § 1; 1962 No.
475, § 1; 1966, Ex. Sess. No. 5, § 1.
75. 275 So. 2d 765 (La. 1973).
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there had been a sufficient "taking" of the wallet to constitute the
basic crime of theft, which was essential to the armed robbery convic-
tion. In affirming the conviction the supreme court held that it was
sufficient if "the robber did have, at some time if only momentarily,
Mr. Howard's wallet in his hand."" If, however, the robber had never
taken possession of the wallet, and had merely knocked it from the
victim's outstretched hand, there would have been no "taking"
within the meaning and requirements of Louisiana's general theft
article." The Neal decision appears to equate the "taking" required
under Louisiana's theft article with the "taking and asportation"
requirement of common law larceny; but it fortunately continues the
common law liberal construction of that requirement when it ap-
proved the trial courts per curiam
to the effect that the slightest asportation of anything of value
• . .the slightest deprivation for the slightest period of time...
the slightest segregation of the property moved for the slightest
distance is sufficient to satisfy the elements of theft, which is a
part of the crime charged. A theft occurs, when the thing is taken,
although it may remain in possession of the thief for only sec-
ondsY
It is of the essence in theft that the thief must have acquired control
of the property. As illustrated by the facts of Neal, the duration of
such control, and the extent and nature of the movement (asporta-
tion) of the article, is immaterial.
DEFENSE OF INSANITY-MCNAUGHTEN TEST
In State v. Frezal the defendant in a felony-murder trial had
urged insanity at the time of the alleged crime as a defense on the
merits. In refusing to give a requested special charge on "irresistible
impulse," the supreme court applied the "right and wrong" test,
which originated in McNaughten's case80 and had been expressly con-
tinued in Louisiana's criminal law by article 14 of the 1942 criminal
code. In answer to appellant's argument that the "right and wrong"
test was "outmoded and archaic," the supreme court reaffirmed its
76. Id. at 770. (Emphasis added).
77. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1; 1970, No.
458, § 1; 1972, No. 653, § 1. For early recognition of this distinction, see Thompson
v. State, 94 Ala. 535, 10 So. 520 (1892).
78. 275 So. 2d at 770.
79. 278 So. 2d 64, 73 (La. 1973).
80. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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previously stated position that any change in the test for the insanity
defense was "a matter which addresses itself to the legislature.""1
Looking at the problem from a standpoint of policy and practicality,
it is submitted that the "irresistible impulse" test, which was urged,
is far from a complete or proper criteria for determining criminal
responsibility. That test contemplates a crime committed in sudden
frenzy and does not recognize that mental illness is sometimes char-
acterized by brooding and reflection. Also there is a serious difficulty
in determining whether the impulse was really irresistible or whether
the defendant just didn't resist. The so-called Durham "product"
test, which was similarly rejected by the Louisiana supreme court in
State v. Plaisance,"2 is so broad that it provides virtually no guidance
for the jury and "almost all criminals could come under such a defini-
tion." If the legislature should re-examine the insanity test of article
14 of the criminal code, the substantial capacity standard of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code may offer a workable
standard which is keyed to modern developments in psychiatry and
also provides some fairly solid jury guidelines.84 As a practical matter,
the "right and wrong" test has seldom served to preclude successful
urging of the insanity defense in really meritorious cases. Where there
is a solid insanity defense, appropriate psychiatric testimony and
other relevant evidence can be channelled into the "right and wrong"
test, which is aimed at showing that at the time of the criminal act
the mentally deficient defendant was unable to appreciate the wrong-
ness of his conduct. Such an approach will be particularly effective
in so-called "irresistible impulse" situations.
ENTRAPMENT
An excellent reiteration of the law of entrapment is provided in
State v. Kelley85 where the defense of entrapment was denied to a
convicted liquor law violator. The distinction between improper en-
81. 278 So. 2d 64, 74 (citing prior cases so holding).
82. 252 La. 212, 210 So. 2d 323 (1968).
83. State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).
84. A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962): Mental Disease or Defect Excluding
Responsibility. "(1) a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct."
85. 263 La. 545, 268 So. 2d 650 (1972).
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trapment which constitutes a defense to crime, and proper police
activity is largely a question of where the criminal intent originated.
It is entrapment where the defendant is lured into a crime upon
suggestion of the police or their agent. It is not entrapment where the
defendant was "ready and willing" and the police merely induced
him to furnish an instance of such violation. Along this line the Kelly
opinion states
[t]here is a clear distinction between inducing a person to do an
unlawful act for the purpose of prosecuting him, and catching
him in a criminal design of his own conception. . . . Entrapment
exists when the offender instigates the crime; that is, the officer
must plan and conceive the crime and the defendant must have
perpetrated it only because of trickery, persuasion or fraud of the
officer. The fact that the officer afforded the opportunities for the
commission of the crime does not defeat the prosecution."6
In essence, the court concludes, "It is a question of fact for the trier
of facts to determine whether the accused had the necessary intent
or persuasion before the suggestion by the officer to commit the
crime.""'
86. Id., 268 So. 2d at 652. An excellent statement of the law of entrapment is found
in Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1951).
87. State v. Kelly, 263 La. 545, 550, 268 So. 2d 650, 652 (1972).
